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Abstract
We take the axiomatic approach to uncover the structure of the revenue-sharing prob-
lem from broadcasting sports leagues. Our starting point is to explore the implications of
three basic axioms: additivity, order preservation and weak upper bound. We show that
the combination of these axioms characterizes a large family of rules, which is made of
compromises between the uniform rule and concede-and-divide, such as the one repre-
sented by the equal-split rule. The members of the family are fully ranked according to
the Lorenz dominance criterion, and the structure of the family guarantees the existence
of a majority voting equilibrium. Strengthening some of the previous axioms, or adding
new ones, we provide additional characterizations within the family. Weakening some of
those axioms, we also characterize several families encompassing the original one.
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper (Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero, 2020a), we have introduced a formal
model to analyze the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among
participating teams, based on the audiences they generate. In this paper, we uncover the
structure of this stylized model further, thanks to the axiomatic approach.
We start considering three basic axioms: additivity, order preservation and weak upper
bound. The rst one says that awards are additive on audiences. The second one says that
awards preserve the order of teams audiences. The third one says that individual awards
are bounded above by the overall revenues obtained from the whole tournament. The three
axioms are satised by three rules that stand out as focal to solve this problem (Bergantiños
and Moreno-Ternero, 2020c). They are the uniform rule, which shares equally among all
participating teams the overall revenues obtained in the whole tournament, the equal-split rule,
which splits the revenue generated from each game equally among the participating teams, and
concede-and-divide, which concedes each team the revenues generated from its fan base and
divides equally the residual.
Our rst result shows that the combination of the three axioms mentioned above actually
characterizes the family of rules compromising between the uniform rule and concede-and-
divide, which actually has the equal-split rule as a focal member. Each rule within the family
is simply dened by a certain convex combination of the uniform rule and concede-and-divide.
We shall refer to this family as the UC-family of rules.
We also show that all rules within the family satisfy the so-called single-crossing property,
which allows one to separate those teams who benet from one rule or the other, depending
on the rank of their aggregate audiences. This has important implications. On the one hand,
the existence of a majority voting equilibrium (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996). That is, if we
allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then there exists a rule that cannot be
overturned by any other rule within the family through majority rule. On the other hand, the
rules within the family yield outcomes that are fully ranked according to the Lorenz dominance
criterion (e.g., Hemming and Keen, 1983). More precisely, for each problem, and each pair of
rules within the family, the outcome suggested by the rule associated with a higher parameter
dominates (in the sense of Lorenz) the outcome suggested by the other rule, which is equivalent
to saying that the former will be more egalitarian than the latter (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 1973).
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We then proceed to consider additional axioms to the structure supporting the UC-family
of rules. We start showing that if we add non-negativity (no team receives negative awards),
then only a specic part of the family survives; namely the rules that are actually convex
combinations of the uniform rule and the equal-split rule, which we shall dub the UE-family
of rules. More interestingly, we can dismiss the weak upper bound axiom to characterize such
a family. To wit, we show that a rule satises additivity, order preservation and non-negativity
if and only if it is a member of the UE-family of rules. This was actually an open question in
Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020c).
It turns out that the other half of the UC-family of rules; namely, the rules that are
actually convex combinations of the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide, dubbed here the
EC-family of rules, can also be singled out. To do so, one simply needs to strengthen the weak
upper bound axiom to maximum aspirations, which says that no team can receive an amount
higher than its claim (i.e., the overall revenues obtained from all the games in which the team
was involved). As a matter of fact, order preservation is not required in its full force for this
characterization, and the cleanest result states that additivity, equal treatment of equals and
maximum aspirations characterize the EC-family of rules. This is almost equivalent to the
characterization in Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020b).1
We also provide additional characterization results for families encompassing the UC-family
of rules, by weakening some of the original axioms considered for its characterization. More
precisely, we characterize the rules satisfying additivity, equal treatment of equals, and either
weak upper bound or non-negativity. We also characterize the rules satisfying additivity and
order preservation and, nally, the rules satisfying additivity and equal treatment of equals. In
all cases, we obtain linear (albeit not convex) combinations of the focal rules mentioned above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model, axioms and rules in
Section 2. In Section 3, we provide the characterization result leading towards the UC-family of
rules and then explore other properties of it. In Section 4, we obtain further characterizations for
specic members of the family. In Section 5 we characterize more general families encompassing
the UC-family of rules. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
1Therein, we use a stronger notion than equal treatment of equals indicating that two teams with the same
claims receive the same awards.
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2 The model
We consider the model introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a). Let N describe
a nite set of teams. Its cardinality is denoted by n. We assume n  3. For each pair of teams
i; j 2 N , we denote by aij the broadcasting audience (number of viewers) for the game played
by i and j at is stadium. We use the notational convention that aii = 0, for each i 2 N .
Let A 2 Ann denote the resulting matrix of broadcasting audiences generated in the whole
tournament involving the teams within N .2 Each matrix A 2 Ann with zero entries in the
diagonal will thus represent a problem and we shall refer to the set of problems as P.3
Let i (A) denote the total audience achieved by team i, i.e.,
i (A) =
X
j2N
(aij + aji):
Without loss of generality, we normalize the revenue generated from each viewer to 1 (to be
interpreted as the pay per view fee). Thus, we sometimes refer to i (A) by the claim of
team i. When no confusion arises, we write i instead of i (A). We dene  as the average
audience of all teams. Namely,
 =
P
i2N
i
n
:
For each A 2 Ann, let jjAjj denote the total audience of the tournament. Namely,
jjAjj =
X
i;j2N
aij =
1
2
X
i2N
i =
n
2
:
2.1 Rules
A (sharing) rule is a mapping that associates with each problem the list of the amounts the
teams get from the total revenue. Without loss of generality, we normalize the revenue generated
from each viewer to 1 (to be interpreted as the pay per view fee). Thus, formally, R : P ! Rn
2We are therefore assuming a round-robin tournament in which each team plays in turn against each other
team twice: once home, another away. This is the usual format of the main European football leagues. Our
model could also be extended to leagues in which some teams play other teams a di¤erent number of times and
play-o¤s at the end of the regular season, which is the usual format of North American professional sports. In
such a case, aij is the broadcasting audience in all games played by i and j at is stadium.
3As the set N will be xed throughout our analysis, we shall not explicitly consider it in the description of
each problem.
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is such that, for each A 2 P, X
i2N
Ri(A) = jjAjj:
The following three rules have been highlighted as focal for this problem (e.g., Bergantiños
and Moreno-Ternero, 2020a; 2020b; 2020c).
The uniform rule divides equally among all teams the overall audience of the whole tour-
nament. Formally,
Uniform, U : for each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
Ui(A) =
jjAjj
n
=

2
:
The equal-split rule divides the audience of each game equally, among the two participating
teams. Formally,
Equal-split rule, ES: for each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
ESi(A) =
i
2
:
Concede-and-divide compares the performance of a team with the average performance of
the other teams. Formally,
Concede-and-divide, CD: for each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
CDi(A) = i  
P
j;k2Nnfig
(ajk + akj)
n  2
=
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2
=
2 (n  1)i   n
2(n  2)
:
The following family of rules encompasses the above three rules.
UC-family of rules

UC
	
2[0;1]
: for each  2 [0; 1] ; each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
UCi (A) = (1  )Ui(A) + CDi(A):
Equivalently,
UCi (A) = (1  )
jjAjj
n
+ 
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2
=

2
+ 
n  1
n  2
(i   ) : (1)
At the risk of stressing the obvious, note that, when  = 0, UC coincides with the uniform
rule, whereas, when  = 1, UC coincides with concede-and-divide. That is, UC0  U and
UC1  CD. Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a) prove that for each A 2 P,
ES(A) =
n
2 (n  1)
U(A) +
n  2
2 (n  1)
CD(A):
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That is, UC  ES, where  = n 2
2(n 1)
.4
Consequently, the UC-family of rules can be split in two.
On the one hand, the family of rules compromising between the uniform rule and the equal-
split rule. Formally,
UE-family of rules

UE
	
2[0;1]
: for each  2 [0; 1] ; each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
UEi (A) = (1  )Ui(A) + ESi(A) =

2
+

2
(i   ):
On the other hand, the family of rules compromising between the equal-split rule and
concede-and-divide.5 Formally,
EC-family of rules fECg2[0;1]: for each  2 [0; 1] ; each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
ECi (A) = (1  )ESi(A) + CDi(A) =
i
2
+ 
n
2 (n  2)
(i   ) :
As Figure 1 illustrates, the family of UC rules is indeed the union of the family of UE rules
and EC rules. Note that UE0  UC0  U , EC1  UC1  CD, whereas ES  UE1  EC0 
UC
n 2
2(n 1) is the unique rule belonging to both families.
U ES CD
z }| {UC
EC
| {z }
UE
| {z }
Figure 1. Illustration of the three families of rules. UC = UE [ EC
2.2 Axioms
We now introduce the axioms we consider in this paper.
The rst axiom we consider says that if two teams have the same audiences, then they
should receive the same amount.
Equal treatment of equals: For each A 2 P, and each pair i; j 2 N such that aik = ajk,
and aki = akj, for each k 2 N n fi; jg,
Ri(A) = Rj(A):
4Note that  approaches 0:5 (from below) for n arbitrarily large.
5We studied this family independently in Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020b).
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The following axiom strengthens the previous one by saying that if the audience of team i
is, game by game, not smaller than the audience of team j, then that team i should not receive
less than team j.
Order preservation: For each A 2 P and each pair i; j 2 N , such that, for each k 2
Nn fi; jg, aik  ajk and aki  akj we have that
Ri(A)  Rj(A):
The next axiom says that each team should receive, at most, the total audience of the games
played by the team.
Maximum aspirations: For each A 2 P and each i 2 N ,
Ri(A)  i:
Alternatively, one could consider a weaker upper bound with the total audience of all games
in the tournament.
Weak upper bound: For each A 2 P and each i 2 N ,
Ri(A)  jjAjj :
The next axiom provides instead a lower bound as it says that no team should receive
negative awards. Formally,
Non-negativity. For each A 2 P and i 2 N;
Ri(A)  0:
It is not di¢cult to show that both maximum aspirations and non-negativity imply weak
upper bound.
The next axiom says that revenues should be additive on A. Formally,
Additivity: For each pair A and A0 2 P
R (A+ A0) = R(A) +R (A0) :
The nal two axioms refer to the performance of the rule with respect to somewhat patho-
logical teams. Null team says that if a team has a null audience, then such a team gets no
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revenue. Essential team says that if only the games played by some team have positive audience,
then such a team should receive all its audience. Formally,
Null team: For each A 2 P, and each i 2 N , such that aij = 0 = aji, for each j 2 N ,
Ri(A) = 0:
Essential team: For each A 2 P and each i 2 N such that ajk = 0 for each pair
fj; kg 2 Nn fig,
Ri(A) = i:
3 The benchmark family
We start this section with a characterization result of the UC-family of rules, our benchmark
family.
Theorem 1 A rule satises additivity, order preservation and weak upper bound if and only if
it is a member of the UC-family of rules.
Proof. It is not di¢cult to show that both the uniform rule and concede-and-divide satisfy all
the axioms in the statement. It follows from there that all the members of the UC-family of
rules satisfy them too.
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the three axioms. Note that, then, R satises equal
treatment of equals too. Let A 2 P. For each pair i; j 2 N , with i 6= j, let 1ij denote the
matrix with the following entries:
1ijkl =
8<
:
1 if (k; l) = (i; j)
0 otherwise.
Notice that 1ijji = 0:
Let k 2 N: By additivity,
Rk(A) =
X
i;j2N :i6=j
aijRk
 
1ij

: (2)
By equal treatment of equals, for each pair k; l 2 N nfi; jg we have that Ri (1
ij) = Rj (1
ij) =
xij, and Rk (1
ij) = Rl (1
ij) = zij. As
P
k2N Rj (1
ij) = jj1ijjj = 1, we deduce that
zij =
1  2xij
n  2
:
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Let k 2 N n fi; jg. By additivity, Rj
 
1ij + 1ik

= xij + zik, and Rk
 
1ij + 1ik

= zij + xik.
By equal treatment of equals, Rj
 
1ij + 1ik

= Rk
 
1ij + 1ik

. Thus,
xij +
1  2xik
n  2
= xik +
1  2xij
n  2
,
(n  2) xij + 1  2xik = (n  2) xik + 1  2xij ,
xij = xik
Therefore, there exists x 2 R such that for each fi; jg  N;
Ri
 
1ij

= Rj
 
1ij

= x, and
Rl
 
1ij

=
1  2x
n  2
for each l 2 N n fi; jg:
By weak upper bound,
x = Ri
 
1ij

 1:
Let k 2 N n fi; jg. By order preservation,
x = Ri
 
1ij

 Rk
 
1ij

=
1  2x
n  2
;
which implies that x  1
n
.
Let
 =
nx  1
n  1
:
As 1
n
 x  1, it follows that 0    1:
Then,
UCk
 
1ij

= (1  )Uk
 
1ij

+ CDk
 
1ij

=
8<
:
(1  ) 1
n
+  = x if k = i; j
(1  ) 1
n
   1
n 2
= 1 2x
n 2
otherwise.
Thus, UC (1ij) = R (1ij). As UC and R satisfy additivity, we deduce from here that
UC(A) = R(A), for each A 2 P.
Theorem 1 shows that the UC-family comprises all rules satisfying three basic and intuitive
properties. We show next that the family exhibits additional interesting features. To begin
with, all rules within the family satisfy the so-called single-crossing property. That is, for each
pair of rules within the family, and each problem A 2 P, there exists a team i 2 N separating
those teams benetting with one rule and those benetting with the other. It turns out that
i is precisely the team whose overall audience is closest (from below) to the average overall
audience. Formally,
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Proposition 1 Let 0  1  2  1, and A 2 P such that, without loss of generality,
N = f1; : : : ; ng and 1  2      n. Then, there exists i
 2 N such that:
(i) UC1i (A)  UC
2
i (A) for each i = 1; :::; i
 and
(ii) UC1i (A)  UC
2
i (A) for each i = i
 + 1; :::; n.
Proof. Let 0  1  2  1, and A 2 P be such that N = f1; : : : ; ng and 1  2      n.
Let i 2 N . We distinguish two cases:
If i  , then
UC1i (A) =

2
+ 1
n  1
n  2
(i   ) 

2
+ 2
n  1
n  2
(i   ) = UC
2
i (A):
If i > , then
UC1i (A) =

2
+ 1
n  1
n  2
(i   ) 

2
+ 2
n  1
n  2
(i   ) = UC
2
i (A):
Thus, i is the agent whose claim is closest to  from below.
It is well known that the single-crossing property of preferences is a su¢cient condition for
the existence of a majority voting equilibrium (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996). Thus, we have the
following corollary from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 There is a majority voting equilibrium for the UC-family of rules.
Corollary 1 states that if we let teams vote for a rule within the UC-family, then there
will be a majority winner. The identity of this winner will be problem specic and, thus, it
will depend on the characteristics of the problem at stake. For problems with a distribution
of claims skewed to the left, only the uniform rule is a majority winner. For problems with a
distribution of claims skewed to the right, only concede-and-divide is a majority winner. For
the remainder of the problems, each UC rule is a majority winner. This is a consequence of
the fact that, as it can be inferred from (1), UCi is increasing (decreasing) in  for agents with
claims above (below) the average claim.
Another well-known consequence of the single-crossing property is that it guarantees pro-
gressivity comparisons of schedules (e.g., Jakobsson, 1976; Hemming and Keen, 1983). Thus,
we can also obtain an interesting corollary from Proposition 1 in our setting, referring to the
distributive power of the rules within the UC-family.
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Formally, given x; y 2 Rn satisfying x1  x2  :::  xn, y1  y2  :::  yn, and
Pn
i=1 xi =Pn
i=1 yi, we say that x is greater than y in the Lorenz ordering if
Pk
i=1 xi 
Pk
i=1 yi, for each
k = 1; :::; n   1, with at least one strict inequality. When x is greater than y in the Lorenz
ordering, one can state (see, for instance, Dasgupta et al., 1973) that x is unambiguously more
egalitarian than y. In our setting, we say that a rule R Lorenz dominates another rule R0 if
for each A 2 P, R(A) is greater than R0(A) in the Lorenz ordering. As the Lorenz criterion is
a partial ordering, one might not expect to perform many comparisons of vectors. It turns out
that, here, all rules within the family are fully ranked according to this criterion.
Corollary 2 If 0  1  2  1 then UC
1 Lorenz dominates UC2.
Corollary 2 implies that the parameter dening the family can actually be interpreted as
an index of the distributive power of the rules within the family.
4 Decomposing the benchmark family
In this section, we scrutinize the UC-family of rules further. We summarize rst the perfor-
mance of the rules within the family with respect to the other axioms introduced above6.
Proposition 2 A member of the UC-family of rules satises
1. non-negativity if and only if it is a member of the UE-family of rules
2. maximum aspirations if and only if it is a member of the EC-family of rules.
3. null team if and only if it is the equal-split rule.
4. essential team if and only if it is concede-and-divide.
Combining Proposition 2 with Theorem 1, and noting that both non-negativity and maxi-
mum aspirations imply weak upper bound, additional characterizations are obtained as imme-
diate corollaries.
Corollary 3 The following statements hold:
6The proof of Proposition 2, and some other results of the paper, can be found in the Appendix.
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1. A rule satises additivity, order preservation and non-negativity if and only if it is a
member of the UE-family of rules.
2. A rule satises additivity, order preservation and maximum aspirations if and only if it
is a member of the EC-family of rules.
Corollary 3.2 is similar to Theorem 1 in Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020b), obtained
by replacing order preservation with an axiom dubbed symmetry. The next result is a rene-
ment of both as it shows that equal treatment of equals, which is weaker than symmetry and
order preservation, closes the gap too.
Proposition 3 A rule satises additivity, equal treatment of equals and maximum aspirations
if and only if it is a member of the EC-family of rules.
Finally, one infers from Proposition 2 that only the equal-split rule satises non-negativity
andmaximum aspirations. But one could also be interested in knowing the allocations satisfying
both bounds for a given problem. This is what the next proposition states.
Proposition 4 For each A 2 P, and each i 2 N , 0  UCi (A)  i if and only if
i   and 0   
n  2
2 (n  1)
+
ni
2 (n  1) (i   )
:
i   and
n  2
2 (n  1)
 
ni
2 (n  1) (  i)
  
n  2
2 (n  1) (  i)
:
In Table 1, we summarize the main results obtained for the benchmark family and its
subfamilies.
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AxiomsnRules
UC
Th.1
UE
Cor. 3
EC
Cor. 3
EC
Pr. 3
ES
Pr. 2
CD
Pr. 2
ETE X
OP X X X X X
MA X X
WUB X X X
NN X
ADD X X X X X X
NT X
ET X
Table 1: Characterizations of rules within the benchmark family
5 Beyond the benchmark family
In this section, we consider some combinations of axioms leading towards rules that extend
the benchmark family studied in the previous sections. In Theorem 2, we characterize the
rules satisfying additivity, equal treatment of equals and weak upper bound. In Theorem 3,
we characterize the rules satisfying additivity, equal treatment of equals and non-negativity.
In Theorem 4, we characterize the rules satisfying additivity and order preservation. In all
cases, we obtain rules that are linear (but not necessarily convex) combinations of the uniform
rule and concede-and-divide. For that reason, we conclude the section studying explicitly the
performance of all the rules within the extended family f(1  )U + CD :  2 ( 1;+1)g
with respect to all the axioms, depending on :
The next result extends Theorem 1, weakening order preservation to equal treatment of
equals.
Theorem 2 A rule R satises additivity, equal treatment of equals and weak upper bound if
and only if there exists  2

1  n
2
; 1

such that, for each A 2 P,
R(A) = (1  )U(A) + CD(A):
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Proof. As mentioned above, the uniform rule and concede-and-divide satisfy additivity and
equal treatment of equals. It follows from there any linear combination of the two rules sat-
ises the two axioms too. As for weak upper bound, one can also show (after some algebraic
computations) that, for each  2

1  n
2
; 1

, (1  )U + CD satises it too.7
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the three axioms. Let A 2 P. For each pair i; j 2 N ,
with i 6= j, let 1ij; x and  be dened as in the proof of Theorem 1. Using arguments similar
to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 we can deduce that R(A) = (1  )U (A) + CD (A).
By weak upper bound, x  1 and 1 2x
n 2
 1. Equivalently, 3 n
2
 x  1: As  = nx 1
n 1
, it
follows that  2

1  n
2
; 1

.
If instead of weak upper bound we consider non-negativity, we also have the following char-
acterization result.
Theorem 3 A rule R satises additivity, equal treatment of equals and non-negativity if and
only if there exists  2
h
 1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
such that, for each A 2 P,
R(A) = (1  )U(A) + CD(A):
Proof. As mentioned above, any linear combination of the uniform rule and concede-and-divide
satises additivity and equal treatment of equals. As for non-negativity, one can also show (after
some algebraic computations) that, for each  2
h
 1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
, (1 )U +CD satises it too.8
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the three axioms. Let A 2 P. For each pair i; j 2 N ,
with i 6= j, let 1ij; x and  be dened as in the proof of Theorem 1. Using arguments similar
to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 we can deduce that R(A) = (1  )U (A) + CD (A).
By non-negativity, x  0 and 1 2x
n 2
 0. Equivalently, 0  x  1
2
: As  = nx 1
n 1
, it follows
that  2
h
 1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
.
We now explore the implications of the combination of additivity and order preservation.
Theorem 4 A rule satises additivity and order preservation if and only there exists  2 [0;1)
such that for each A 2 P,
R(A) = (1  )U(A) + CD(A):
7See Remark 2 in the Appendix.
8See Remark 3 in the Appendix.
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Proof. As mentioned above, any linear combination of the uniform rule and concede-and-
divide satises additivity. As concede-and-divide satises order preservation, and the uniform
rule assigns the same amount to all teams, it follows that (1  )U + CD also satises order
preservation for each  2 [0;1).
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the two axioms. Let A 2 P. For each pair i; j 2 N ,
with i 6= j, let 1ij; x and  be dened as in the proof of Theorem 1. Using arguments similar
to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 we can deduce that R(A) = (1  )U (A) + CD (A).
By order preservation, x  1 2x
n 2
which implies that x  1
n
. As  = nx 1
n 1
, it follows that
 2 [0;+1) :
We conclude this section with our more general result, which explores the implications of
the combination of additivity and equal treatment of equals.
Theorem 5 A rule satises additivity and equal treatment of equals if and only there exists
 2 ( 1;+1) such that, for each A 2 P,
R(A) = (1  )U(A) + CD(A):
Proof. As mentioned above, any linear combination of the uniform rule and concede-and-
divide satises additivity and equal treatment of equals. Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying
the two axioms. Let A 2 P. For each pair i; j 2 N , with i 6= j, let 1ij; x and  be dened as
in the proof of Theorem 1. Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1
we can deduce that R(A) = (1  )U (A) + CD (A). As no further axioms are considered, no
bounds on the domain of  can be imposed, from where it follows that  2 ( 1;+1) :
In Table 2, we summarize the main results obtained for the benchmark family and the
extended families considered in this section. When we write [a; b] at the top of a column, we
refer to the family of rules f(1  )U + CD :  2 [a; b]g.
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AxiomsnRules
[0; 1]
Th.1

1  n
2
; 1

Th. 2
h
 1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
Th. 3
[0;+1)
Th. 4
( 1;+1)
Th. 5
ETE X X X
OP X X
WUB X X
NN X
ADD X X X X X
Table 2: Beyond the benchmark family
We conclude this section studying the performance of all rules within the general family
f(1  )U + CD :  2 ( 1;+1)g
with respect to the axioms considered in this paper.
Proposition 5 The following statements hold:
(a) (1  )U + CD satises additivity for each  2 ( 1;+1) :
(b) (1  )U + CD satises equal treatment of equals for each  2 ( 1;+1) :
(c) (1  )U + CD satises order preservation if and only if  2 [0;+1).
(d) (1  )U + CD satises weak upper bound if and only if  2

1  n
2
; 1

:
(e) (1  )U + CD satises maximum aspirations if and only if  2
h
n 2
2(n 1)
; 1
i
:
(f) (1  )U + CD satises non-negativity if and only if  2
h
 1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
:
(g) (1  )U + CD satises null team if and only if  = n 2
2(n 1)
:
(h) (1  )U + CD satises essential team if and only if  = 1:
Proposition 5 can be summarized in the following table.
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Axioms  2
Additivity ( 1;+1)
Equal treatment of equals ( 1;+1)
Order preservation [0;+1)
Weak upper bound

1  n
2
; 1

Maximum aspirations
h
n 2
2(n 1)
; 1
i
Non-negativity
h
  1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
Null team n 2
2(n 1)
Essential team 1
Table 3: Performance of the rules with respect to the axioms

1  n
2  
1
n 1
0 n 2
2(n 1)
1 +1 1
WUBz }| {
Figure 2. Performance of the rules with respect to the axioms.
z }| {OP
z }| {ETE
| {z }
MA
| {z }
NN
6 Discussion
We have explored in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenues
raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights in sports leagues. We have uncovered
the structure of this problem, setting the ground with three basic axioms: additivity, order
preservation and weak upper bound. The combination of these axioms characterizes a large
family of rules, which is made of compromises between the uniform rule and concede-and-
divide, having the equal-split rule as a focal member. Thus, the family encompasses the three
basic rules highlighted so far in this model. The family can be perfectly split in two, with
the equal-split rule setting the limits for both parts, strengthening the weak upper bound in
two opposite directions (maximum aspirations or non-negativity). If instead of strengthening
the original axioms once weakens them in natural ways, extensions of the original family are
characterized too.
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Common to all of our characterization results is the axiom of additivity. This is an invariance
requirement with a long tradition in axiomatic work (e.g., Shapley, 1953) but also considered
strong under some circumstances. For results without additivity in this model, the reader is
referred to Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020c).
All the families of rules we obtained are extremely well structured. They are all parametrized
by a single element, which serves as an index of the distributive power of the rules. More
precisely, once can fully rank in terms of the Lorenz dominance criterion the outcomes obtained
by all the rules within each family, according to the parameter dening the family. Also, one can
guarantee the existence of majority voting equilibria, when all teams are allowed to vote for the
rule to share the broadcasting revenues, within each of these families. These two features are
shared by some other one-parameter families of rules existing in the literature for related models
(e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006a,b; Thomson, 2008; Moreno-Ternero, 2011; Thomson,
2019).
One could also be interested into approaching our problems with a (cooperative) game-
theoretical approach, a standard approach in many related models of resource allocation (e.g.,
Littlechild and Owen, 1973; van den Nouweland et al., 1996; Ginsburgh and Zang, 2003). In
Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a), we associate to our problems a natural optimistic
cooperative TU game in which, for each subset of teams, we dene its worth as the total
audience of the games played by the teams in that subset. The Shapley value (e.g., Shapley,
1953) of such a game yields the same solutions as the equal-split rule for the original problem.
The egalitarian value (e.g., van den Brink, 2007) of that game yields the same solutions as
the uniform rule. Casajus and Huettner (2013), van den Brink et al., (2013) and Casajus and
Yokote (2019) characterize the family of values arising from the convex combination of the
Shapley value and the egalitarian value. In our setting, this would correspond to the family
of rules

UE
	
2[0;1]
considered here. Thus, Corollary 3.1 in our paper could be considered
as a parallel result to some of the results in that literature. No known value for TU-games is
associated to concede-and-divide and, thus, no parallel characterization of the family of rules
UC
	
2[0;1]
considered here can be obtained in the literature on TU-games.
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To save space, we have included in this appendix, which is not necessarily intended for
publication, some technical aspects of our analysis, as well as secondary proofs.
7 Appendix
7.1 Missing proofs
Remark 1 The axioms of Theorem 1 are independent.
For each A 2 P, and each i 2 N; we dene the rule R1 as
R1i (A) =
8<
:
U (A) if jjAjj  100
CD (A) if jjAjj > 100:
R1 satises all axioms in the theorem but additivity.
Let R2 be dened as follows. For each fi; jg 2 N and k 2 N we dene
R2k
 
1ij

=
8<
:
0 if k 2 fi; jg
1
n 2
otherwise
We extend R2 to each problem A using additivity. Namely, R2 (A) =
P
fi;jgN
aijR
2 (1ij) : R2
satises all axioms in the theorem but order preservation.
Let R3 be dened as follows. For each fi; jg 2 N and k 2 N we dene
R3k
 
1ij

=
8<
:
2 if k 2 fi; jg
 3
n 2
otherwise
We extend R3 to each problem A using additivity. Namely, R3 (A) =
P
fi;jgN
aijR
3 (1ij) : R3
satises all axioms in the theorem but weak upper bound.
Proof of Proposition 2. For statement 1, it is obvious that all rules within the UE-family
satisfy non-negativity because both U and ES do so. We have seen above that the UC-family is
the union of the UE-family and the EC-family. Besides, ES is the only rule in the UC-family
belonging to the UE-family and the EC-family. Thus, we only need to show that any rule
within the EC-family, except for ES, violates that axiom. To do so, consider, for instance, the
problem in which
A =
0
BBB@
0 0 0
0 0 150
0 150 0
1
CCCA :
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As CD1(A) =  300 and ES1(A) = 0, it follows that (1  )ES1(A) + CD1(A) < 0, for each
 2 (0; 1].
For statement 2, Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020b) prove that any rule in the EC-
family satises maximum aspirations. Thus, it is enough to show that any rule within the UE-
family, except for ES, violates that axiom. The previous example would be valid for that too.
Note that U1(A) = 100 and 1 = 0. As ES1(A) = 0, it follows that (1 )U1(A)+ES1(A) >
1, for each  2 [0; 1).
As for statements 3 and 4, they are a straightforward consequence of Theorem 1 in Bergan-
tiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a), and the fact that order preservation implies equal treatment
of equals. 
Proof of Proposition 3. It is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Bergantiños and Moreno-
Ternero (2020b). 
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let A 2 P, i 2 N , and  2 [0; 1]. Then, UCi (A)  0 if and only if
jjAjj
n
+ 
n  1
n  2
(i   )  0:
Equivalently, as jjAjj = n
2
,
(n  2) + 2 (n  1) (i   )  0;
i:e:,
 (i   )   
n  2
2 (n  1)
:
Now, if i  , the above holds trivially. If, instead, i < , then the above is equivalent
to
 
n  2
2 (n  1) (  i)
;
as desired.
Now, UCi (A)  i if and only if
jjAjj
n
+ 
n  1
n  2
(i   )  i:
Equivalently,
 (i   ) 
(n  2) (i   ) + ni
2 (n  1)
:
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If i  , the above is equivalent to
 
n  2
2 (n  1)
+
ni
2 (n  1) (i   )
:
If i < ; the above is equivalent to
 
n  2
2 (n  1)
 
ni
2 (n  1) (  i)
:

Remark 2 (1  )U + CD satises weak upper bound, for each  2

1  n
2
; 1

.
Let A 2 P, i 2 N , and  2

1  n
2
; 1

. Then, (1 )Ui(A)+CDi(A)  jjAjj if and only if

2
+ 
n  1
n  2
(i   ) 
n
2
:
Equivalently,
 (i   ) 
n  2
2
: (3)
We consider three cases.
1. i = : Then (3) obviously holds.
2. i > : Then (3) is equivalent to
 
(n  2)
2(i   )
:
As   1 it is enough to prove that
1 
(n  2)
2(i   )
:
Equivalently,
2(i   )  (n  2)
which holds because i  jjAjj =
n
2
.
3. i < : Then (3) is equivalent to
 
(n  2)
2(i   )
:
As   1  n
2
; it is enough to prove that
1 
n
2

(n  2)
2(i   )
:
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Equivalently,
  i  ;
which obviously holds.
Remark 3 (1  )U + CD satises non-negativity, for each  2
h
 1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
.
Let A 2 P, i 2 N , and  2
h
 1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
. Then, (1  )Ui(A) + CDi(A)  0 if and only if

2
+ 
n  1
n  2
(i   )  0:
Equivalently,
 (i   ) 
  (n  2)
2(n  1)
(4)
We consider three cases.
1. i = : Then (4) obviously holds.
2. i > : Then (4) is equivalent to
 
  (n  2)
2(n  1)(i   )
:
As    1
n 1
, it is enough to prove that
1
n  1

(n  2)
2(n  1)(i   )
:
Equivalently,
2i  n;
which holds because i  jjAjj =
n
2
.
3. i < : Then (4) is equivalent to
 
  (n  2)
2(n  1)(i   )
:
As   n 2
2(n 1)
, it is enough to prove that
n  2
2(n  1)

(n  2)
2(n  1)(  i)
:
Equivalently,
  i  ;
which obviously holds.
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Proof of Proposition 5.
Statements (a) and (b) are trivial.
As for statement (c), and as mentioned in the proof of Theorem 4, as concede-and-divide
satises order preservation, and the uniform rule assigns the same amount to all teams, it
follows that (1  )U + CD also satises order preservation for each  2 [0;+1). It remains
to show that the property is violated for any  2 ( 1; 0). Consider the same problem as above
in which
A =
0
BBB@
0 0 0
0 0 150
0 150 0
1
CCCA :
As U(A) = (100; 100; 100) and CD(A) = ( 300; 300; 300), it follows that (1   )U1(A) +
CD1(A) = 100  400 > 100 + 200 = (1  )U2(A) + CD2(A), for each  2 ( 1; 0).
As for statement (d), and as shown in Remark 2, (1 )U+CD satises weak upper bound
for each  2

1  n
2
; 1

. It remains to show that the property is violated for any  =2

1  n
2
; 1

.
To do so, aonsider, again, the same problem as above. Then, as U(A) = (100; 100; 100) and
CD(A) = ( 300; 300; 300), it follows that (1 )U2(A)+CD2(A) = 100+200 > 300 = jjAjj,
for each  > 1. Similarly, (1   )U1(A) + CD1(A) = 100   400 > 300 = jjAjj, for each
 <  1
2
= 1  n
2
.
As for statement (e), and as shown in Proposition 2, (1   )U + CD satises maximum
aspirations for each  2
h
n 2
2(n 1)
; 1
i
.9 It is also shown therein that for each  2
h
0; n 2
2(n 1)

, the
property is violated. Thus, it remains to show that the property is also violated for any  =2 [0; 1].
To do so, consider, again, the same problem as above. Then, as U(A) = (100; 100; 100) and
CD(A) = ( 300; 300; 300), it follows that (1   )U1(A) + CD1(A) = 100   400 > 0 = 1,
for each  < 0. Similarly, (1  )U2(A) + CD2(A) = 100 + 200 > 300 = 2, for each  > 1.
As for statement (f), and as shown in Remark 3, (1   )U + CD satises non-negativity
for each  2
h
 1
n 1
; n 2
2(n 1)
i
. As shown in Proposition 2, for each  2

n 2
2(n 1)
; 1
i
, the property
is violated.10 Thus, it remains to show that the property is also violated for any  =2

 1
n 1
; 1

.
To do so, consider, again, the same problem as above. Then, as U(A) = (100; 100; 100) and
CD(A) = ( 300; 300; 300), it follows that (1 )U1(A)+CD1(A) = 100  400 < 0, for each
 > 1. Similarly, (1  )U2(A) + CD2(A) = 100 + 200 < 0, for each  <  
1
2
=   1
n 1
.
9Note that those rules correspond precisely with the UE-family of rules.
10Note that those rules correspond precisely with the EC-family of rules.
25
Statements (g) and (h) are straightforward consequences of Proposition 2. 
7.2 Extra material
We now study which specic rule within the UC-family could be a majority winner for each
problem. We obtain three di¤erent scenarios, depending on the characteristics of the problem
at stake. For some problems, only the uniform rule is a majority winner. For some other
problems, only concede-and-divide is a majority winner. For the remainder of the problems,
each rule within the family is a majority winner.
For each A 2 P, we consider the following partition of N , with respect to the average
claim (): Nl (A) = fi 2 N : i < g, Nu (A) = fi 2 N : i > g, and Ne (A) = fi 2
N : i = g. That is, taking the average claim (within the tournament) as the benchmark
threshold, we consider three groups referring to individuals with claims below, above, or exactly
at, the threshold. When no confusion arises, we simply write Nl, Nu; and Ne. Note that
n = jNlj+ jNuj+ jNej.
Proposition 6 Let A 2 P. The following statements hold:
(i) If 2jNlj > n, then U (A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If 2jNuj > n, then CD (A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) Otherwise, each UC (A) is a majority winner.
Proof. Let 0    1, and A 2 P. For each i 2 N ,
UCi (A) =
jjAjj
n
+ 
n  1
n  2
(i   ) :
If i > , then UC

i (A) is an increasing function of , thus maximized at  = 1. This
implies that, for each i 2 Nu, CDi(A) is the most preferred outcome (among those provided by
the family).
If i < , then UC

i (A) is a decreasing function of , thus maximized at  = 0. This
implies that, for each i 2 Nl, Ui(A) is the most preferred outcome (among those provided by
the family).
If i = ; then UC

i (A) =
jjAjj
n
for each  2 [0; 1] : This implies that, for each i 2 Ne, all
rules in the family yield the same outcome.
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From the above, statements (i) and (ii) follow trivially. Assume, by contradiction, that
statement (iii) does not hold. Then, there exists A 2 P and  2 [0; 1] such that UC is not a
majority winner for A. Thus, we can nd 0 2 [0; 1] such that UC
0
i (A) > UC

i (A) holds for
the majority of the teams. We then consider two cases:
Case 0 > .
In this case, UC
0
i (A) > UC

i (A) if and only if i 2 Nl: Now,
jNlj =
ni 2 N : UC0i (A) > UCi (A)
o
>
ni 2 N : UC0i (A)  UCi (A)
o
= jNuj+ jNej
which is a contradiction.
Case 0 < .
In this case, UC
0
i (A) > UC

i (A) if and only if i 2 Nu: Now,
jNuj =
ni 2 N : UC0i (A) > UCi (A)
o
>
ni 2 N : UC0i (A)  UCi (A)
o
= jNlj+ jNej
which is a contradiction.
Proposition 6 implies that if the distribution of claims is skewed to the left (i.e., the median
claim is below the mean claim), then the uniform allocation (the most equal allocation within
the family) is the majority winner, whereas if it is skewed to the right (i.e., the median claim
is above the mean claim), then the concede-and-divide allocation (the most unequal allocation
within the family, as proved below) is the majority winner. If it is not skewed, then any
compromise allocation can be a majority winner.
The single-crossing property also guarantees that the social preference relationship obtained
under majority voting is transitive, and corresponds to the median voters. In our setting,
the median voter corresponds to the team with the median overall audience (claim). Thus,
depending on whether this median overall audience is below or above the average audience, the
median voters preferred rule (and, thus, the majority winner) will either be the uniform rule
or concede-and-divide. In other words, a tournament with a small number of very strong teams
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(i.e., with very high claims in relative terms) will proclaim the uniform allocation (the one
favoring weaker teams more within the family) as the majority winner, whereas a tournament
with a small number of very weak teams (i.e., with very small claims in relative terms) will
proclaim the concede-and-divide allocation (the one favoring stronger teams more within the
family).
Corollary 4 Let A 2 P be such that n is odd. The following statements hold:
(i) If m < , then U(A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If m > , then CD(A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) If m = , then any UC
(A) is a majority winner.
Proof. If m < , then jNlj  m. Hence 2jNlj > n. By Proposition 6, statement (i) holds.
If m > , then jNuj  m. Hence 2jNuj > n By Proposition 6, statement (ii) holds.
If m = , then jNlj < m; jNuj < m; and jNej > 0. Hence, we are in case (iii) of the
statement of Proposition 6, which concludes the proof.
Corollary 5 Let A 2 P be such that n is even. The following statements hold:
(i) If n+2
2
< , then U(A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If n
2
> , then CD(A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) If n
2
   n+2
2
, then any UC(A) is a majority winner.
Proof. If n+2
2
< , then jNlj 
n+2
2
. Hence 2jNlj > n. By Proposition 6, statement (i) holds.
If n
2
> , then jNuj 
n+2
2
. Hence 2jNuj > n. By Proposition 6, statement (ii) holds.
Suppose now that n
2
   n+2
2
: Then, it is enough to prove that we are in case (iii) of
the statement of Proposition 6. That is, we have to prove that neither jNlj > jNuj + jNej nor
jNuj > jNlj+ jNej hold. We consider several subcases:
1. If  = n
2
, then jNlj <
n
2
, jNuj 
n
2
and jNej > 0.
2. If n
2
<  < n+2
2
, then jNlj =
n
2
, jNuj =
n
2
and jNej = 0.
3. If  = n+2
2
, then jNlj 
n
2
, jNuj <
n
2
and jNej > 0.
In either case, the desired conclusion holds.
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